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ABSTRACT 
Understanding sources of knowledge (e.g., seeing leads to knowing) is an important 
ability in young children’s theory of mind development. The research presented here 
measured if children were better at reporting their own versus another person’s 
knowledge states, which would indicate the presence of introspection. Children had to 
report when the person (self or other) had knowledge or ignorance after looking into one 
box and not looking into another box. In Study 1 (N = 66), 3- and 4-year-olds found the 
other-version of the task harder than the self-version whereas 5-year-olds performed near 
ceiling on both versions. This effect replicated in Study 2 (N = 43), which included 
familiarization trials to make sure children understood the question format. This finding 
is in support of the presence of introspection in preschool-aged children. In the same 
studies, children also showed evidence for theorizing about their own and others 
knowledge states in a guessing task (Study 1) and in true and false belief tasks (Study 2). 
These findings together indicate both introspection and theorizing are present during 
young children's theory of mind development. 
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The role of introspection in children’s developing theory of mind. 
  A hallmark of children’s social development is learning how mental states (i.e., 
beliefs, knowledge, perception, desires, intentions etc.) determine how people view the 
world and as a result, guide their behavior within it. Specifically, children must develop a 
theory of mind (ToM). Over the last 30 years, researchers have examined when ToM 
develops in young children. A main focus has been children’s performance on false belief 
tasks which children begin to pass around the time they turn four years old (Wellman, 
Cross, & Watson, 2001); however there has also been considerable examination of 
precursory abilities such as children’s understanding of perception, desire, and 
knowledge (Wellman & Liu, 2004). Despite this large body of research, theorists have 
disagreed about how children’s understanding of these mental states develops.  
The development of metacognitive abilities such as introspection, an awareness of 
one’s own mental processes, is one mechanism researchers have explored. The ability to 
use introspection is generally thought to be relatively late developing, emerging around 
middle childhood (Flavell, Green, & Flavell, 1995). Researchers have ruled out the 
presence of introspection in some stages of ToM development like the understanding of 
false belief. Children are no better at reporting their own false beliefs than they are at 
reporting other’s false beliefs which is evidence against introspection (Gopnik & 
Astington, 1988; Fabricius & Khalil, 2003). However, evidence has been more 
inconsistent for earlier stages of ToM development, like the understanding sources of 
knowledge (i.e., seeing leads to knowing). For example, after having a child or another 
person look into a box to see what was inside, some researchers found that children were 
better at reporting their own knowledge than reporting others’ knowledge (Ruffman & 
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Olson, 1989; Wimmer, Hogrefe & Perner, 1989) which is evidence for introspection; 
although, other investigators have found no difference in performance between self and 
other (Pillow, 1989; Pratt & Byrant, 1990).  
The purpose of the present research is two-fold: to investigate the role of 
introspection in the development of children’s theory of mind, and to resolve the 
inconsistent findings on children’s understanding of seeing leads to knowing. Doing so 
informs theories of ToM development.  
How theory of mind develops 
There are two competing theories that describe how ToM develops, simulation-
theory and theory-theory. Simulation-theorists propose that children use their own mind 
as a model to learn about and understand the minds of other people. In this view, children 
first recognize a mental state in themselves, and when reasoning about another person, 
children imagine themselves in that person’s situation, introspect their own mental state 
within that situation, and then attribute the mental state back to the other person (Gordon, 
1986; Harris, 1992). For example, in order to understand how a person might feel when 
walking down a dark alley, one could imagine him- or herself as the actual person in the 
alley, introspect a feeling of fear or anxiety, and then understand how the other person is 
feeling. For children to understand seeing leads to knowing, they would be able to 
introspect their own feelings of knowing after looking into a box, and for other people, 
they can imagine themselves as the person looking in box, introspect a feeling of 
knowing, and then attribute that back to the person.   
Theory-theorists propose that people use naïve theories to understand their own 
and other people’s mental states (Gopnik & Wellman, 1992). In this view, people do not 
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have direct access to their mental processes, but instead uses the same set of theories to 
reason about their own and other people’s mental states. Using the same example as 
above, one would not have to go through the process of imagining him- or herself in the 
dark alley, but could instead just have a naïve theory that people are scared when in dark 
alleys. For children to connect seeing to knowing, children first must have a theory of 
seeing (e.g., when a person’s lines of sight is directed towards an object, they are able to 
see that object) and a theory of knowing (e.g., when a person interacts with an object, 
they know something about it). Children then must connect the two so that seeing causes 
enduring knowledge (e.g., a person does not always have to see an object in order to 
know something about it).   
There is strong evidence against children using simulation even at older ages. For 
example, Fabricius and colleagues (Fabricius, Boyer, Weimer, & Carroll, 2010; Fabricius 
& Imbens-Bailey, 2000; Fabricius & Khalil, 2003) found evidence for theorizing about 
false beliefs with children as old as six years old. They found preschool-aged children use 
two behavioral rules: “seeing leads to knowing,” and “knowing means getting it right” to 
pass standard false belief tasks. Fabricius and colleagues called this Perceptual Access 
Reasoning (PAR). Children’s overextension of PAR can be demonstrated when 4- and 5-
year-olds pass false belief tasks, but fail a true belief tasks. For example in a false-belief 
version of an unexpected contents task, when a child is shown a Smarties candy box that 
contains pencils, 4- and 5-year-olds reason a person will think there are Smarties in the 
candy box because he does not know there are pencils inside. In the true-belief version, 
children are shown a candy box with pencils, but instead of putting the pencils back in 
the box, they are replaced with Smarties. The same 4- and 5-year-olds who pass a false 
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belief task will reason a person will think there are pencils in the candy box because he 
does not know there is candy inside. It is not until children are six or seven years old that 
they start reasoning about beliefs and pass both tasks. 
The role of introspection in theory of mind development 
 Researchers have searched for evidence of introspection in ToM development in 
many domains of children’s social reasoning and behavior. As minimum evidence for 
children to demonstrate introspection, children must not just act in accord with being in a 
state of knowing (e.g., searching in the correct place for an object when they know where 
it is), but they must demonstrate they also know they are in a state of knowing (Perner, 
2012). Until recently, there were few instances where consistent evidence for 
introspection in young children could be found. For example, preschoolers are seemingly 
unaware of ongoing mental processes like stream of consciousness or thinking (Flavell, 
Green, & Flavell, 1995), and it is not until middle-childhood that children are able 
verbally report experiencing these events. The relatively late development of clear 
introspective abilities has even led some researchers to the counterintuitive claim that one 
might have to learn about others’ minds before one is able to recognize his or her own 
mind (e.g., Gopnik, 1993), but this topic that is still widely debated (Carruthers, 2009). 
There is some recent evidence that children may have more introspective ability 
than previously thought. With newer behavioral measures, 4- and 5-year-olds can show 
awareness of some of their mental states (Coughlin, Lyons, & Ghetti, 2014; Ghetti, 
Hembacher, & Coughlin, 2013; Hembacher & Ghetti, 2014). For example, Hembacher 
and Ghetti (2014) found that preschool-aged children were able to accurately judge their 
uncertainty in a memory task and later use this uncertainty to inform their decision 
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making. Children were able to say they were less certain about items in a memory task 
they studied only once versus items they studied twice. They were later able to excluded 
some of their answers to questions they were uncertain about in order to earn better 
prizes. Young children were able to accurately monitor the quality of their knowledge 
states which is something that they were previously thought to be incapable of doing.  
 This recent evidence leads one to suggest that a reevaluation of previous evidence 
of a lack of introspection in preschool-aged children is needed. The evidence for 
theorizing in ToM development has resulted in a diminished interest in measuring 
children’s understanding of their own mental states. Some of the most widely used 
measures of preschoolers’ ToM, such as the Scaling Theory of Mind tasks (Wellman & 
Liu, 2004), do not include a single measure of children’s understanding of their own 
mental states. The previous studies where a self-other difference is found were explained 
as the result of methodological differences which caused some children to perform worse 
on the other-version of the tasks than on the self-version; but upon closer examination, 
there are issues with this claim that are unresolved.  
Self and other differences in understanding seeing leads to knowing 
The four studies that examined children’s understanding of seeing leads to 
knowing for self and other shared many procedural elements. All the studies required 
participants to answer multiple questions about a person’s knowledge after looking into a 
one box and ignorance after not looking into another box, and all the studies examined 
the developmental trends between 3- and 4-year-olds. Where the studies differed was in 
their scoring procedures, question format and inclusion of warm-up trials to their 
procedures. As seen in Table 1, the studies by Wimmer, Hogrefe and Perner (1988) and 
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by Ruffman and Olson (1989) found that 3- and 4-year-olds performed better on the self-
version of the task than on the other-version of the task and that 4-year-olds performed 
better overall. The studies by Pillow (1989) and Pratt and Bryant (1990) found no 
difference in performance between self and other, and 3- and 4-year-olds performed 
equally as well.  
The reason for the contradicting findings between the studies was initially 
explained as differences between their question formats (Pratt & Bryant, 1990). The 
study by Wimmer et. al. (1988) found that 4-year-olds performed better than 3-year-olds, 
and both groups did better for self than they did for other. The study by Pillow (1989) 
found no difference in performance for 3- and 4-year-olds, each group did equally well 
on for self and other. Pratt and Bryant argued that the reason why Wimmer et. al. found a 
difference between self and other was due to their question format being confusing for 
some children. In the study by Wimmer et. al., children were asked, “Do you / [other 
child] know what is in the box, or do you / [other child] not know that?” whereas the 
study by Pillow asked the simpler test question, “Do you / [other child] know what’s in 
the box?” Pratt and Bryant attempted to replicate the study by Wimmer et. al. but found 
most participants interrupted the experimenter half way through the question. Pratt and 
Bryant took this as evidence that children found the question overly complicated, and 
when they were able to replicate the study by Pillow, finding no difference in 
performance between self and other using the simpler question format, they concluded 
that the study by Wimmer et. al. artificially lowered children’s performance on the other-
version of the task, but not the self-version. A problem with this claim is the study by  
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Ruffman and Olson (1989) who like Wimmer et al. also found a difference between self 
and other, but counter to Pratt and Bryant’s explanation, did so using the simple test 
question format.  
Because the self-other difference in children’s performance on seeing leads to 
knowing tasks in these studies cannot be explained by the different question formats, one 
of the only remaining explanations for the conflicting findings is difference between the 
studies scoring procedures. All four studies required children to correctly answer a 
knowledge and an ignorance question to be scored as correct. This method prevented 
children from erroneously being scored as correct through a yes-bias or a no-bias. The 
difference between the studies was how performance for self and other were scored from 
these questions. To be scored as correct for self or other in the studies by Wimmer et. al. 
(1988) and Ruffman and Olson (1989), children’s answers were scored within-agent but 
across trials (see Figure 1). For example, children were scored as passing self only if 
they correctly answered the knowledge question when they looked in the box in the first 
trial and the ignorance question when they did not look in the box in the second trial. The 
result of this method was children were only able to answer the questions about the other 
person through theorizing that seeing leads to knowing. Children were able to able 
answer questions about themselves through theorizing or introspection. To be scored as 
correct for self or other in the study by Pillow, children’s answers were scored as within-
trial but across-agents. The study was more interested in determining if children could 
answer a knowledge and ignorance question when the child looked into a box versus 
answering a knowledge and ignorance questions when someone else looked. For 
example, children were scored as passing self if they could correctly answer both the 
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knowledge question about themselves and the ignorance question about the other person 
when the child looked into a box. Children could answer the first question through 
introspection or theorizing and the first question through theorizing.   
It is likely that children who only had introspection would be scored as doing 
better overall when using the scoring procedures in the study by Pillow (1989) compared 
to the procedures used by Wimmer et. al (1988). To be scored as correct for self or other, 
children could answer the question about themselves through introspection and could 
guess on the question about the other. This changes the performance that would be 
expected by chance alone. Children without theorizing who were scored between-trials 
for other would have to guess on two questions. The only way to understand what the 
other person knew was to make the theoretical connection between seeing and knowing. 
If these questions are scored within-trials, introspection and theorizing cannot be 
separated.  
There is one issue with the argument that the different scoring procedures 
changed children’s performance. The study by Pratt and Bryant (1990) used the correct 
scoring procedures to separate the use of theorizing ad introspection, but they did not find 
a difference in performance between self and other. The only remaining procedural 
difference with the study by Wimmer et. al. (1988) was the study by Pratt and Bryant 
included a set of warm-up trials in their procedures. Before children received any of the 
test trials, the experimenter gave the children different colored tokens and asked them a 
set of Yes/No questions: “Does (other) have the green tokens?” and “Do you have the 
green tokens?” in order to make sure children were capable of answering the test  
questions. Whereas there is no immediately apparent reason why these warm-up trials 
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would change children’s performance, there is a possible explanation. A potential 
problem in all four of the studies is the chance of a carry-over effect between trials. 
Within each trial, the child and the other person always had opposite mental states. One 
person always had knowledge and the other person had ignorance. Children with 
introspection would be able to know when they knew the contents of the box and when 
they did not. Over repeated trials, they could then learn to default the opposite mental 
state to the other person. This would allow for correct responses without ever having to 
theorize about seeing leads to knowing. In the three studies before Pratt and Bryant, there 
were a limited number of trials, which would minimize the chance of a carry-over effect, 
but the inclusion of warm-up trials potentially trained children on this procedural-
regularity before any of the actual test trials were given. This difference in methodology 
could explain why children who did not have theorizing performed just as well as 
children who did.  
   In summary, the four studies looking at self and other presented conflicting 
results. The studies by Wimmer et. al. (1988) and Ruffman and Olson (1989) both found 
that 4-year-olds performed better than 3-year-olds, and that both age groups performed 
better for self and they did for other. In contrast, the study by Pillow (1989) and the study 
by Pratt and Bryant (1990) found no difference in performance between self and other, 
and that 3-year-olds were able to theorize about seeing leads to knowing for other people 
just as often as 4-year-olds. Pratt and Bryant attempted to explain this discrepancy as a 
result of the different question formats, but this study did not address the different scoring 
procedures used in the study by Pillow. The effect of question format did not replicate 
with Ruffman and Olson, which rules it out as a possible explanation. Additionally, the 
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lack of a self-other difference in the replication attempt by Pratt and Bryant can be 
explained by addition of warm-up trials, which inadvertently trained children on how to 
get the correct answer without theorizing.  
The Current Studies 
 The current studies examined the role of introspection in children’s developing 
theory of mind. Evidence for children’s introspective ability during the preschool years 
has been sparse with only a few recent publications providing evidence that children may 
have some limited capabilities (Coughlin et al., 2014; Ghetti et al., 2013; Hembacher & 
Ghetti, 2014). As an improvement over previous studies, children completed tasks that 
differentiated between their use of theorizing and introspection in their understanding of 
seeing leads to knowing. Children completed separate tasks to measure their 
understanding of their own and someone else’s knowledge state. It was hypothesized 
children would show evidence for introspection by performing better on self-version of 
the task versus the other-version of the task. Second, it was hypothesized that the same 
children would also show evidence for theorizing and not simulation when asked to 
reason about the mental states of other people. This was seen by examining 
overextensions of children’s naïve rules for how mental states are related to behavior 
such as children’s understanding of guessing and on children’s use of PAR. 
Study 1 
  The purpose of this study was to resolve the conflict from the literature on 
children’s understanding of seeing leads to knowing by testing children’s ability to reason 
about their own and someone else’s knowledge using separate tasks. Using separate tasks 
for self and other removes any chance that children could use introspection to answer 
11 
questions about the other person’s knowledge, and could only use theorizing. The 
probability for any carry-over effect is diminished because the child’s mental state was 
independent of the other person’s mental state. Any difference in performance between 
the two versions of the task would be evidence for introspection.  
It was also predicted that even with the presence of introspection, children should 
still show evidence of theorizing and not for simulation. Children who were theorizing 
about knowledge states should overextend naïve rules about how mental states and 
behavior are related. This hypothesis was tested using a guessing task which measured 
children’s use of the rule” knowing means getting it right.” Using this rule, children 
should infer that a person who correctly guessed the location of an object knew where it 
was, and a person who guessed incorrectly did not know where it was even though that 
the person never actually knew where it was to begin with. Children who simulate a 
feeling of knowing in each case would say that the person never knew where the object 
was. It was predicted that even with evidence for introspection in the seeing leads to 
knowing tasks, children would still show evidence for theorizing in the knowing means 
getting it right task.          
Method 
Participants 
 Sixty-six children ages 3-0 to 6-0 participated in this study. Children were 
recruited from university-sponsored preschools in a large metropolitan area in the 
Southwestern United States. There were thirty-two 3-year-olds (14 female, M = 3-6, 
range = 3-0 to 3-11), nineteen 4-year-olds (eight female, M = 4-6 range = 4-0 to 4-11), 
and fifteen 5-year-olds (five female, M = 5-5, range = 5-0 to 6-0). No information about 
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the participants’ ethnicity or socioeconomic status was explicitly obtained, however, most 
participants were from middle-class, European-American families, and all were native 
speakers of English. 
Materials 
 Twelve small wooden boxes of various colors (red, white, blue and green) were 
used. Each box could be closed with a lid on a hinge. For the seeing leads to knowing 
tasks, one of the boxes contained a small bronze key. For the knowing means getting it 
right tasks, two boxes contained a small pencil, which was glued down inside the box. 
Two other boxes contained a penny, which was also glued down. All of the remaining 
boxes were empty. Another penny and pencil were used to show the child what the object 
looked like during knowing means getting it right tasks. Three plastic dolls were used in 
the other-versions of all the tasks. 
Design and Procedure 
Participants were tested individually during the school day in a quiet room away 
from other children. The participant sat across from the experimenter at a small table, and 
a video camera recorded the participant’s responses. Participants received nine tasks that 
tested their understanding of several mental state concepts. Only four of those tasks were 
analyzed for the current study. These tasks were the self- and other-versions of the Seeing 
Leads to Knowing, and Knowing means Getting it Right tasks. Participants received the 
tasks in a random order with some constraints. For both the self and other versions of 
each task, the Seeing Leads to Knowing task was always immediately followed by the 
corresponding Knowing means Getting it Right task. 
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Seeing leads to knowing. The Seeing Leads to Knowing task measured 
participants’ understanding of perception as a source of knowledge. The task measured 
participants’ ability to report a person’s knowledge after looking in one box and 
ignorance after not looking into a second box. In two separate tasks, participants’ ability 
to report this for themselves (self) and for another person (other) were tested using new 
materials for each version of the task. In the self-version, the participant looked into one 
box and did not look into the second box. In the other-version, the participant watched as 
a doll looked into one box and did not look into the second box. Participants had to 
differentiate that the person (either the participant or the doll) knew the contents of the 
first box but did not know the contents of the second box. 
In each version of the task (See Figure 2), the experimenter placed two different 
colored boxes on the table. In the self-version, one of the boxes contained a key, and the 
other box was empty. In the other-version, both boxes were empty, but the experimenter 
acted out having the doll see something in one of them. The experimenter told the 
participant “I’m going to show [you/doll] what is in the [first] box, but not what is in the 
[second] box” and then opened the first box. In the self-version of the task, the participant 
identified the object and held it briefly. In the other-version of the task, the experimenter 
acted out the doll looking into the box and saying, “Okay I see what’s in the box” (the 
participant was not allowed to see in). In both versions, the experimenter then closed the 
box and said, “I’m going to ask you if [you/doll] knows what is in each of these boxes. 
Tell me “yes” if [you/doll] knows or “no” if [you/doll] doesn’t know.” Before asking 
each of the test questions in the other-version, the experimenter reminded the participant 
of the doll’s perceptual access by saying “[Doll] looked in the [first] box” or “[Doll] did 
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not look in the [second] box,” This was followed by the knowledge-question, “Do 
[you/doll] know what is in the [first] box?” and the ignorance-question, “Do [you/doll] 
know what is in the [second] box?” If the participant did not give a discernibly 
affirmative or negative response to the test question, the instructions to answer with “yes” 
or “no” and the question were repeated once. If the participant did not give a discernable 
response again, his or her response was counted as an incorrect, and the participant was 
scored as not passing the task. 
Knowing means getting it right. The Knowing means Getting it Right task 
explored children’s theorizing about the relationship between knowledge states and 
behavior. The use of this rule was tested in both the children themselves, and for 
children’s understanding of other people. The experimenter placed two unopened boxes 
on the table and showed the participant an object, a penny in the self-version or a pencil 
in the other-version. In the self-version of the task, the participant guessed which of two 
boxes also contained a penny. In the other-version, the participant watched as a doll 
guessed which box contained a pencil. For each version, participants received two trials, 
a right-condition trial and a wrong-condition trial. In the right-condition, both boxes 
contained the object and the person was always right, and in the wrong-condition, with 
two new boxes (and a new doll in the other-version), neither box contained the object and 
the person was always wrong. Participants received the right-condition first, and the 
wrong-condition second. 
In both the self- and other-version of the task (See Figure 3), the experimenter 
showed the participant the penny or pencil and said, “See this [object]? One of these 
boxes has a [object] just like this in it.” In the self-version, the experimenter asked the 
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participant to pick a box. In the other-version, the experimenter acted out having the doll 
pick a box. In both versions, the experimenter then said, “I’m going to ask you if 
[you/doll] knew where the [object] was when [you/doll] picked this box. Tell me “yes” if 
[you/doll] knew or “no” if [you/doll] didn’t know.” After this, the experimenter opened 
the box and said, “[You/doll] got it right.” in the right-condition or “[You/doll] got it 
wrong.” in the wrong-condition. This was followed by the test question, “Did [you/doll] 
know where the [object] was when [you/doll] picked this box?” 
Results and Discussion 
Seeing leads to knowing 
There were four response combinations possible between the knowledge- or 
ignorance-questions. The correct response pattern was an affirmative response when the 
person knew and a negative response when the person did not know1. The three incorrect 
patterns consisted of two affirmative responses (Yes Bias), two negative responses (No 
Bias) or the opposite of the correct pattern (Inverse). The proportion of participants who 
gave each response pattern in the self- and other-versions of the task is shown in Table 2. 
Participants performed better on the self-version of the task than on the other-version. 
One participant did not complete the other-version of the task due to experimenter-error 
which means only 65 participants had complete data. 
                                                           
1 In the self-version of the task, some participants answered by saying the actual contents 
of the box in the knowledge-question, (e.g., they answered with “a key”). This was 
counted as a correct affirmative response as long as they also correctly answered the 
ignorance-question with a negative response. This same procedure was used in all 
previous studies.  
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To examine children’s use of introspection, a multilevel logistic regression was 
conducted using Mplus version 7.1 (Muthén & Muthén, 2007). A multilevel model is 
analogous to a repeated measures ANOVA but offers several advantages such as 
potential for increased power and better handling of missing data (Cohen, Cohen, West, 
& Aiken, 2002). Logistic regression was used for dichotomous data. A logistic 
transformation turns the probability of being scored as passing the task from a value 
bounded between zero and one into a “logit score” which is on a continuous scale. This 
transformation was done by the following equation:  
 = ln 	 
1 − 
 
where ln is the natural logarithm and p is the probability of being scored as correct. Using 
this transformation, a logit of zero represents a 50% chance of being scored as passing. 
This also represents even odds of passing or an odds ratio of one (the natural logarithm of 
one is zero). Logit scores greater than zero or an odds ratio greater than one represent an 
increase in probability and logit scores less than zero or an odds ratio less than one 
represent a decrease in probability (Cohen et al., 2002). 
The results of the regression analysis are reported in Table 3. Person (Self vs. 
Other) was treated as a within-subject predictor, and age and gender were used as 
between-subject predictors. Overall, the logistic model significantly improved fit over a 
null model, 3 = 31.71, 
 < .001,  = .20. There was an effect of age where 
probability of passing the tasks increased steadily with age. There was also an effect of 
person; participants’ probability of passing the other-version of the task was lower than 
the probability of passing the self-version. The effect of gender was not significant, and 
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there were no significant interactions. The predicted probability of passing each version 
of the task at every age is illustrated in Figure 4. Participants reached a 50% chance of 
passing the self-version around 39-months-old; however, participants did not reach a 50% 
chance of passing the other-version until 46-months-old. This suggests there was about a 
seven month gap when participants only had introspection to their knowledge, but did not 
understand the source of that knowledge.  
Knowing means getting it right 
 There were four response combinations possible between the right- and wrong-
conditions in the knowing means getting it right task. Table 4 shows the proportion of 
participants who responded with each pattern. Only a small minority of participants 
responded with the correct pattern by saying the person did not know in both the right- or 
wrong-condition trials. The majority of participants responded with an affirmative 
response in the right-condition and a negative response in the wrong-condition which is 
indicative of theorizing. Several participants did not give a discernibly affirmative or 
negative response in one or both of the conditions. The most common occurrence of this 
happened in the wrong-condition in the self-version of the task. When asked if they knew 
where the object was when picking the box, many participants made the logical inference 
of the object’s location and pointed to that box or said the object was in there. In all these 
occurrences, participants also responded affirmatively in the right-condition. To be 
conservative, all participants who gave a non-response were scored as failing the task.  
The relation between participants who used theorizing in the seeing leads to 
knowing and theorizing in the Knowing means Getting it Right task was examined. 
Because several participants’ responses in the self-version of the Knowing means Getting 
18 
it Right task were difficult to interpret, only the other-version of each task was analyzed. 
The impact of participants’ performance on the seeing leads to knowing task was 
significant, 1,  = 65 = 4.90, 
 =  .027. Of the 36 participants who passed the 
Seeing Leads to Knowing task for other, 30 of them gave the theorizing response in the 
knowing means getting it right task, while the 29 participants who failed the seeing leads 
to knowing task for other were more evenly distributed with only 17 giving a theorizing 
response.  
Study 2 
The findings from Study 1 suggest that younger preschoolers are better at 
reporting their own knowledge than reporting others’ knowledge. This is evidence for 
introspection playing a role in children’s theory of mind development. Previous studies 
(Wimmer et. al., 1988; Pillow, 1989) have found inconsistent evidence for a self-other 
difference, but these mixed findings can be explained by the study’s procedures not 
controlling for the child’s introspective awareness. There still is a remaining possibility 
that the pretest familiarization trials in the study by Pratt and Bryant (1990) managed to 
improved participants’ performance in some other way besides training participants on 
procedural regularities. To address this issue, familiarization trials were added to the 
procedures for the Seeing Leads to Knowing task from Study 1.    
The Knowing means Getting it Right task from Study 1 put children’s use of 
theorizing about a person’s knowledge directly in conflict with their understanding of 
seeing leads to knowing. Most participants showed evidence for theorizing about other 
people’s knowledge, using the behavior rule, however there was some considerable noise  
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in children’s responses in the self-version of the task. A more pure measure of children’s 
use of theorizing for both self and other is needed.    
 
It is also unclear how children’s understanding of seeing leads to knowing 
corresponds to performance on false-belief tasks. Some studies have found a delay 
between acquiring an understanding of seeing leads to knowing and passing a False 
Belief task (Hogrefe, Wimmer, & Perner, 1986; Wellman & Liu, 2004). This delay 
means that understanding seeing leads to knowing is a necessary, but not sufficient 
condition for passing the False Belief task. However, it is unclear if these findings will be 
replicated with the current procedures for the Seeing Leads to Knowing task. If children’s 
abilities were artificially inflated in the older procedures, it is possible that understanding 
seeing leads to knowing could be a sufficient condition for passing the False Belief task. 
A second possibility is that both an understanding of seeing leads to knowing and the 
knowing means getting it right are needed to pass a false belief task, and additionally a 
delay could stem from children acquiring each concept individually, and then having to 
learn to use them together.  
Method 
Participants 
Forty-three children between the ages of 3-1 and 5-11 participated in this study. 
Participants were recruited from university-sponsored preschools in a large metropolitan 
area in the Southwestern United States. There were nineteen 3-year-olds (ten female, M = 
3-6, range = 3-1 to 3-11), twenty-one 4-year-olds (six female, M = 4-4, range = 4-0 to 4-
10), and three 5-year-olds (one female, M = 5-8, range = 5-1 to 5-11). Because there were 
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so few 5-year-olds in the study, the data for the 4- and 5-year-olds were collapsed 
together when age was not used as a continuous predictor. Ethnicity for the participants 
was non-Hispanic or non-Latino (81%) and Hispanic or Latino (16%) or not reported 
(2%). Participants’ race was Caucasian (83%), African American (2%), Asian (2%), 
Native American (2%) and multi-racial or another race (7%). Most participants were 
native speakers of English (95%). If English was not reported as their native language, 
teaching staff reported them to have proficient English skills (5%). Participants came 
from two-parent households (84%), single parent households (12%), and households with 
more than two adults (4%). Parents’ highest level of education ranged from completion of 
high school to a PhD or MD. Median education was a college degree for both mothers 
and fathers. Household income ranged from less than $15,000 a year to over $100,000 a 
year with a median income of between $75,000 and $100,000 a year.  
Materials 
The Pre-test used small plastic tokens of different colors (red, blue, yellow). The 
same kinds of materials for the Seeing Leads to Knowing task from Study 1 were used 
again here. The Knowing means Getting it Right task used four pairs of wooden boxes 
painted different colors. The warm-up trials for that task used two plain colored wooden 
boxes, and one box contained a Lego block. The Belief Understanding Task used 
separate materials for the True Belief and False Belief tasks. The False Belief task used a 
typical crayon box and a small toy car was the unexpected item found inside the box. The 
True Belief task used a movie-theater style box of M&M candies. The M&M candies 
were kept in a clear plastic cup, and a small bronze key was used as the unexpected item 
found in the box.   
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Design and Procedure 
  Participants were tested individually during the school day in a room away from 
other children. The participant sat across from the experimenter at a small table, and two 
video cameras recorded both the participant and the experimenter. Participants received 
the tasks in one of four fixed orders with the Seeing Leads to Knowing tasks first, 
followed by the Knowing Means Getting it Right tasks and the True Belief and False 
Belief tasks. The order of the Self and Other versions of each task, and the order of the 
true and false belief tasks were counterbalanced.  
Pretest. Like Pratt and Bryant (1990), all participants started with a brief pretest. 
The purpose of this was to familiarize participants with the question format used in the 
remaining tasks, and to exclude any participants who could not follow this procedure. 
Participants answered three sets of questions where they were instructed to answer “yes” 
or “no.” Following Pratt and Bryant’s (1990) criteria, any participant that could not 
answer two of the three sets correctly was excluded from the remaining tasks. 
The experimenter placed three plastic tokens on the table asked the participant to 
say the color of each token. The experimenter removed one token and pointed to one of 
the two remaining tokens. In the first question of the set, the experimenter called the 
token the wrong color and asked, “Is this the [wrong color] token?” After the 
participant’s response, the experimenter pointed to other token, called it the right color 
and asked, “Is this the [right color] token?” This made sure the participant could respond 
to the experimenter with both yes and no. The experimenter swapped one of the tokens 
with the one removed previously, and the procedure was repeated three times. Only two 
22 
participants (one 3-year-old and one 4-year-old) failed to answer two sets of questions 
correctly. Those participants were excluded from further analysis.    
 Seeing leads to knowing. Participants’ understanding of seeing leads to knowing 
was measured using the same procedures from Study 1.  
 Knowing means getting it right. Like Study 1, the Knowing means Getting it 
Right task explored participants’ use of theorizing. This was accomplished by asking 
participants to predict if a person would act correctly or incorrectly when the person had 
knowledge or was ignorant of an objects location (see Figure 5). This is in contrast to 
Study 1 where the participant reported a person’s knowledge after the person acted 
correctly or incorrectly. Participants were tested separately for self and other.  
To start, participants received a brief pretest. The experimenter placed two plain-
wood colored boxes on the table and the participant looked into both. One box had a 
Lego block inside, and the other box was empty. The experimenter then closed the boxes 
and asked the participant where the right place to look for the block was, and then asked 
where the wrong place to look for the block was. The purpose of this was to disambiguate 
what the experimenter meant when asking if a person would look in the “right” box. Two 
3-year-olds could not answer both pretest questions correctly and were excluded from 
analysis in this task.  
In both the self- and other-version, the experimenter placed two boxes on the 
table. In the self-version, the experimenter said, “Here are two boxes. One of these boxes 
has a pencil inside,” and then opened the boxes briefly to show the participant where the 
object was. In the other-version, the experimenter placed a doll on the table and said 
“These are two cupboards in [Doll’s] kitchen, and one of the cupboards has some 
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crackers in it.” The boxes were never opened. In both versions, the experimenter then 
told the participant “[You/Doll] know where the [pencil/crackers] is” and then asked the 
test question, “When [you/doll] first look for the [pencil/crackers], will [you/doll] look in 
the right box?” After the participant’s response, the experimenter asked a justification 
question, “Why [will/won’t] [you/doll] look in the right box?” The experimenter then 
placed two new boxes on the table. In self-version, the experimenter said, “Here are two 
more boxes. One of these boxes has a rock inside.” In the other-version, the experimenter 
said, “These are two toy boxes in [Doll’s] room. One of the toy boxes has a teddy bear in 
it” and the boxes were never opened. In both versions of the task, the experimenter then 
told the participant “[You/Doll] don’t know where the [object] is” and asked the same 
test and justification questions. This required participants to predict a person’s behavior 
in a knowledge- and ignorance-condition.  
Belief understanding. Participants’ belief understanding was be assessed using 
the procedures from Fabricius et al (2010). Participants were given a standard False 
Belief task, and a True Belief task. The combination of these two tasks allowed 
participants’ belief understanding to be categorized into reality reasoning (RR), 
perceptual access reasoning (PAR), a mixture between RR and PAR, and belief reasoning 
(BR). 
In the false belief task, participants were shown a typical crayon box, and asked 
what they thought was inside. After the participant correctly guessed “crayons,” the 
experimenter opened the box to show the participant there was really a car inside. The 
participant held the object for a moment, and the experimenter placed the car back inside 
the box then closed it. The experimenter asked two control questions: “What kind of box 
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is this?” and “What is inside the box now?” If the participant answered either question 
wrong, the participant was corrected and asked the question again. The experimenter set 
up the test question by first saying, “Let’s pretend I have a friend named Suzie waiting 
right outside. She’s never seen inside this box” and then the experimenter asked “When 
she first looks at this box, before she opens it, will she think there are crayons or a car 
inside?” The order of saying the belief or reality option first in the test question was 
counterbalanced. After the participant’s response, the experimenter asked the justification 
question “Why will she think there is [crayons/car] inside?”  
In the true belief task, the experimenter showed the participant the M&M’s candy 
box, and asked the participant what they thought was inside. The experimenter opened 
the box and showed the participant there was really a key inside. Instead of putting the 
key back in the box, the experimenter took out a clear plastic cup filled with M&M’s and 
poured it into the box. The participant was asked two control questions: “What is inside 
the box now?” and “What was inside the box when I first showed it you?” If the 
participant answered either question wrong, the participant was corrected and asked the 
question again. The experimenter then removed the empty cup and key from the table and 
asked the test and justification questions in the same format as before only replacing the 
character Susie with a new character (Sam).      
Results and Discussion 
Seeing leads to knowing 
 Performance on the self- and other-versions of the Seeing Leads to Knowing task 
was analyzed the same way as it was in Study 1. The proportion of participants who gave 
each combination of affirmative and negative responses within the self- and other-
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versions in the task is shown in Table 2. Like in Study 1, participants’ performance on 
both tasks improved with age, but performance was better in the self-version than in the 
other-version for both age groups.  
 To see if the effect of person in Study 1 replicated in Study 2, a continuously 
cumulating meta-analytic (CCMA) approach was taken. The CCMA approach corrects 
for the increased probability of not replicating small to moderate effect sizes when using 
similar sample sizes. This is done by pooling the data from both studies together, and 
using Study as a predictor in the analysis (Braver, Thoemmes, & Rosenthal, 2014; 
Rosenthal, 1990). If the effect of study and its interactions are not significant, then it can 
be said the effect of person replicated. If the effect of study or its interactions is 
significant, then the effect of person can be said to not replicate and the effect was 
dependent on the study.  
 The results of the CCMA multi-level logistic regression analysis are reported in 
Table 3. The effect of Study was non-significant, but the effect of Person and Age 
remained significant. There were no significant interactions. The logistic model still 
significantly improved fit over a null model, 4 = 36.33, 
 < .001,  = .14.  
Knowing means getting it right 
 In both the self- and other-versions of the task, there were four response 
combinations between the two test questions. Table 4 shows the proportion of 
participants who responded with each pattern. In contrast to Study 1, only a minority of 
participants gave the response expected with theorizing. The majority of participants 
responded in the Yes Bias pattern. Most participants said the person would be right when 
they knew and also when they did not know.  
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This pattern of responses was unexpected, because the majority of participants in 
Study 1 gave the response expected with theorizing. One possibility is that participants 
misunderstood the test questions as can the person (i.e., is the person capable of) looking 
in the right box instead of will the person look in the right box. This is supported by the 
fact that most participants responded with the Yes Bias pattern here whereas in Study 1, 
the proportion in each error patterns was more even distributed. Additional evidence 
comes another study that examined children’s use of knowing means getting it right in a 
No Belief task (Fabricius, Carroll, Weimer, and Boyer, 2009). The No Belief task is 
analogous to the ignorance question in the Knowing means Getting it Right task. In both 
tasks, participants had to predict if a person would chose the correct or incorrect option. 
In the No Belief task, the participant knew which box was right and which box was 
wrong. In the current task, the participant did not know which was correct and which was 
incorrect. Fabricius and colleagues (2009) found that around 50% of a sample of 4-year-
olds answered a person who had no belief would choose the wrong option. Because there 
were so few participants who responded this way in the current task, this finding suggests 
participants misunderstood the test question. Another possibility is making participants 
think about the right and wrong options more abstractly could have been too challenging 
for them.  
Belief Understanding 
 Children’s performance on the False Belief and True Belief tasks were 
categorized as Reality Reasoning (RR), mixtures, Perceptual Access Reasoning (PAR), 
or Belief Reasoning (BR) using the coding scheme suggested by Fabricius and colleagues 
(2010, see Appendix A). As a brief summary, participants who failed the False Belief 
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task but passed the true belief task were categorized as RR. Children who failed the True 
Belief task, but passed the False Belief task were categorized as PAR. Children who 
passed both the True Belief and False Belief tasks and also provided a correct 
justification (e.g., “because it’s a crayon box”) were categorized as BR. Children who 
passed both tasks but did not provide the correct justifications, or children who failed 
both tasks were categorized as a mixture between RR and PAR. The proportion of 
participants in each category is presented in Table 5. The majority of 3- and 4-year-olds 
were categorized as RR while the proportion of children who were in other categories 
increased with age. There was significant agreement in categorization between two raters, 
! =  .899, 
 <  .001.  
 Because there were issues with the Knowing means Getting it Right task, only the 
relation between performance on the Seeing Leads to Knowing task and participants’ 
Belief Understanding was examined. The number of children who passed the other 
version of the seeing leads to knowing task was compared to the proportion of children 
who passed the False Belief task. Performance on the Seeing Leads to Knowing to task 
had a significant effect on the performance on the False Belief task, 1,  = 41 =
5.33, 
 =  .021. Only two of the 17 participants who failed the Seeing Leads to knowing 
task passed the False Belief task. Of the 24 participants who passed the other-version of 
seeing leads to knowing, performance was more evenly distributed with 11 passing and 
13 failing the Seeing Leads to Knowing task. This finding is in line with previous studies 
(e.g., Wellman and Lui, 2004) that suggests understanding seeing leads to knowing is a 
necessary, but not sufficient condition of the False Belief task.   
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General Discussion 
 Until recently (Hembacher & Ghetti, 2014), there was little evidence that 
preschool children are capable of introspection; most children are not able to verbally 
report any conscious awareness of their own mental states (Flavell et al., 1995) or do not 
show any sort of advantage when reporting their own false beliefs over the false beliefs 
of other people (Gopnik & Astington, 1988; Wellman et al., 2001). One area with 
conflicting findings in previous studies has been in children’s ability to report their own 
knowledge versus the knowledge of someone else; some researchers found that children 
had a self-advantage (Ruffman & Olson, 1989; Wimmer, Hogrefe, & Perner, 1988) 
which is indicative of introspection, whereas other researchers found no difference 
between self and other (Pillow, 1989; Pratt & Bryant, 1990). This contradiction in the 
literature was initially explained simply as an artifact caused by differences in the studies 
methodologies; however, this explanation failed to take into account all the studies 
available at the time which discounts it as a possible explanation. The methodologies 
from some of the studies could not separate children’s use of introspection from 
theorizing. This omission resulted in artificially inflating children’s performance for other 
while leaving performance for self unaffected.  
 The present studies looked to resolve this problem by introducing improved 
procedures which could more easily separate children’s use of introspection and 
theorizing using separate tasks for self and other. Three- and 4-year-olds found the self-
version of the seeing leads to knowing task easier than the other version, and it was not 
until children were four years old that the majority of children were able to pass both  
versions of the task. Only 5-year-olds performed equally well in both tasks. These 
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findings are in support of children being capable of introspecting their own feeling of 
knowing.  
 In support of this view, there is additional evidence in previous literature that 
suggests there are real qualitative differences between 3- and 4-year-olds in their 
understanding of seeing leads to knowing. Whereas researchers in two of the four studies 
reviewed above found no difference in 3- and 4-year-olds, there many other studies 
where 3-year-olds did not do well as well as 4-year-olds (Hogrefe et al., 1986; Marvin, 
Greenberg, & Mossler, 1976; Wellman & Liu, 2004). In these studies, it was not until 
children were four years old that a majority of children passed tasks that measured their 
understanding of seeing leads to knowing in other people. Although some of the 
differences in these studies could be explained as sampling error, there are other studies 
that demonstrated 3-year-olds have a limited understanding of seeing leads to knowing 
compared to 4-year-olds. For example, Perner and Ogden (1988) found that most 4-year-
olds could explain why a person had knowledge after looking in a box, but the majority 
of 3-year-olds could not. This finding was not due to some general problem with 
justifying internal states since most 3-year-olds could explain other internal states like 
hunger. Together, findings from studies like these casts doubt on the claim that there is 
no difference between 3- and 4-year-olds’ understanding of seeing leads to knowing. 
It is clear from the findings from this and other recent studies that young children 
are capable of introspection; however, neither simulation-theory nor theory-theory can 
explain why children would be capable of both introspection and theorizing. Some 
theorists have proposed possible hybrid models which allow for an interaction between 
simulation (i.e., introspection) and theorizing (e.g., Saxe, 2005). A question that arises 
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with proposing these types of hybrid models is why children would ever need both 
introspection and theorizing because the two abilities so often overlap in their predictive 
usefulness.   
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One possibility is that the two systems are actually redundant and develop 
independently of each other. Children would use theorizing in some situations and 
introspection in other situations. What determines which ability is used would just be the 
specific, situational context. There would be some occasions when children would 
introspect their knowledge states (e.g., the seeing leads to knowing task), and other 
occasions when children would theorize about their knowledge states (e.g., the knowing 
means getting it right task). To argue for this model though, one would have to determine 
how introspection or theorizing provided an advantage over the other in each situation.  
A more compelling possibility is that the introspection and theorizing interact 
with one another and develop concurrently. Although it is possible that children could 
learn about the relation between seeing and knowing by only observing the relation 
between typical behavioral cues (e.g., line of sight, acting correctly), the presence of 
introspection allows for a more efficient path for children to recognize the relation 
between seeing and knowing. Children with introspection are aware of when they know 
and when they don’t know and thus would be able to recognize when they change from 
one state to the other. Children would then be able to search for events that co-occur with 
this change such as changing from not seeing to seeing. Over repeated exposures to these 
two events co-occurring, children would be able to recognize the relation between the 
two states more readily than relying on the behavioral cues alone.    
Only theorizing about observed behavioral cues actually presents several 
challenges to children. There are instances were relying on the behavioral cues to seeing 
and knowing would actually interfere which children’s ability to recognize the relation 
between the two, such as instances of guessing and forgetting. With guessing children 
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would witness a person who did not have a line of sight but still managed to act correctly, 
and with forgetting, they would witness a person having a line of site but acting 
incorrectly. By only theorizing about the behavioral cues, children would incorrectly 
conclude that there was no relation or possibly even a negative relation between seeing 
and knowing in these events. Theorizing about introspective experiences in both cases 
allows children to correct their wrong assumptions about the behavioral cues. In the case 
of guessing, children would recognize they did not see and did not know, but still 
managed to act correctly. In the case of forgetting, they would recognize they did see and 
did know but some other factor lead them to forget. Theorizing about introspective 
experiences in these cases leads children to eventually update their assumptions about 
behavioral cues into more complex indicators of mental states. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
In order to make stronger claims about the causal influence of introspection in 
children’s ToM development, there is a clear need for longitudinal data that demonstrates 
that children must first learn about their own knowledge states before they can learn 
about someone else’s knowledge states. The cross-sectional data children are first passing 
the self-version of the task before the other-version, but without data on the 
developmental trajectories of individual children, no stronger claims can be made than 
children simply finding the other-version harder than the self-version.   
It is possible that there could be several trajectories for how children learn about 
other people’s mental states. Some children might not use introspection and only use 
theorizing to understand their own and others mental states. Individual differences in 
these patterns could be a potentially fruitful endeavor for future research. For example, 
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children with autism spectrum disorders do not pass false belief tasks until much older 
ages than typically developing children even when controlling for mental age (Baron-
Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985). These children do eventually pass false belief tasks; 
however, it has always been assumed that they do so in a way that is somehow different 
than typically developing children (Frith, 2004). It is possible that their delay in 
theorizing could be in part due to the inability to introspect their own mental states in 
order to facilitate theory building. Further evidence is needed to support the recent 
findings for introspection in typically developing preschool children before stronger 
claims can be made about atypical development.  
If children are capable of introspecting their knowledge states, they must also be 
capable of introspecting other earlier developing mental states as well, such a children’s 
understanding of perception. Most 2 ½ -year olds can demonstrate an understanding of 
level-1 perception, determining what a person can and cannot see (Flavell, Everett, Croft, 
& Flavell, 1981), which is about the earliest age in which verbal-based tasks are 
appropriate for young children. There has so far been no evidence that children are able 
to report their own level-1 perception any more accurately than other’s level-1 
perception; however, most of these studies suffer from a similar problem as the seeing 
leads to knowing tasks. In most cases, the other person’s perception is always the 
opposite on the child’s perception. One person always sees the object, and the other 
person does not. It is possible that these tasks could be inflating children’s understanding 
of level-1 perception in other people in manner similar to the previous versions of the 
seeing leads to knowing task. If a self-other difference is found, then it would suggest 
that introspection is an integral part children’s early ToM development.    
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Conclusions 
The contradiction in the literature on children’s understanding of seeing leads to 
knowing has been unaddressed for over 25 years. Children performed better on the self-
version of the seeing leads to knowing task than on the other-version, which is indicative 
of introspection. The current findings add to the recent evidence for young children are 
capable of some introspective abilities. 
Evidence for both introspection and theorizing in children’s understanding of 
mental states has the potential to help resolve one of the critical issues in research on 
ToM, how children construct a concept of other minds. Neither of the leading current 
theories of children’s ToM development can explain why both introspection and 
theorizing would be present in young children. New models that incorporate introspection 
and theorizing into children’s theory of mind development are needed.  
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Table 1  
Proportion of children in previous studies who understood seeing leads to knowing for self and other. 
 
Study Features  
Mean 
Age Self Other 
      
 
Wimmer Hogrefe & Perner 
(1988) 
• Complex question format 
• Separates introspection and 
theorizing 
• Low carry-over effect 
 
Study 1 
 
3-7 
 
4-6 
 
.50 
 
.94 
 
.13 
 
.56 
Study 2 4-7 .86 .64 
Study 3 4-2 .90 .65 
 
Ruffman & Olson (1989) • Simple question format 
• Separates introspection and 
theorizing.  
• Low carry-over effect 
 
Study 1 3-6 .87 .39 
Study 2 3-7 .82 .41 
Pillow (1989)  • Simple question format 
• Conflates introspection and 
theorizing 
• Low carry-over effect 
 
Study 1 3-5 
 
4-6 
.69 
 
.69 
.56 
 
.75 
Pratt & Bryant (1990) 
 
• Simple Question format 
• Separates introspection and 
theorizing 
• High carry-over effect 
 
Study 2 
 
3-8 
 
.81 
 
.75 
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Table 2.  
Proportion of Children in each Response Pattern in the Seeing Leads to Knowing task 
for Self and Other in Study 1 and Study 2.  
 
Study 1 
Response 
Pattern 
Condition Person and Age 
Know 
Don’t 
Know 
Self  Other 
3 4 5  3 4 5 
Correct 
Pattern Yes No .53 .79 .93  .34 .58 .93 
Yes Bias Yes Yes .34 .11 .07  .25 .21 - 
No Bias No No .03 - -  .16 .21 - 
Inverse No Yes - .05 -  .13 - - 
 Non-Response a .09 .05 -  .13 - - 
Study 2 
Response 
Pattern 
Condition Person and Age 
Know 
Don’t 
Know 
Self  Other 
3 4  3 4 
Correct 
Pattern Yes No .56 .83  .44 .70 
Yes Bias Yes Yes .28 .17  .28 - 
No Bias No No .11 -  .11 .17 
Inverse No Yes .06 -  .17 .13 
 Non-Response a - -    
a Children in this pattern did not give a discernable affirmative or negative response in one or both 
conditions.  
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Table 3. 
Summary of Multilevel Logistic Regression Analysis for Seeing Leads to Knowing 
Performance in Study 1 and Study 2  
 
 Study 1  
Predictor # $% # OR 
Person (Self vs. Other) -1.241* .574 .289 
Gender -.775 .735 .461 
Age (in months) .202*** .059 1.224 
Constant a .579 .642 1.784 
Model  (3)= 31.71, p < 
.001 
   
  = .20    
Study 2 
Predictor # $% # OR 
Study (CCMA) .241 .558 1.27 
Person (Self vs. Other) -1.159** .432 .314 
Gender -.403 .560 .668 
Age (in months) .170*** .042 1.185 
Constant a .269 .915 1.308 
Model  (4)= 36.22, p < 
.001 
   
  = .14    
Note: Person is scored as Self = 0, Gender is scored as Female = 0. 
OR (odds ratio) < 1.0 indicates a decrease in odds for passing the task. OR > 1.0 indicates an increase in 
the odds of passing the task.  
a The intercept value is for Self (Person = 0) for Females and with Age centered at 42 months. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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Table 4.  
Proportion of Children in each Response Pattern in the Knowing means Getting it 
Right task for Self and Other in Study 1 and Study 2.  
 
Study 1 
Response 
Pattern 
Condition Person and Age 
Right Wrong 
Self  Other 
3 4 5  3 4 5 
Correct  No No .06 .21 .13  .03 .11 .13 
Know = 
Right  
Yes No .66 .42 .40  .63 .84 .80 
Yes Bias Yes Yes .13 .21 .07  .16 - .07 
Inverse No Yes - .05 .07  .03 - - 
 Non-
response 
No - - .07  .03 .05 - 
Inference Yes 
Non-
responses 
.13 .05 .20  .06 - - 
  Non-
Response 
Non-
Response 
.03 .05 .07  .06 .- - 
Study 2 
Response 
Pattern 
Condition Person and Age 
Knowledge Ignorance 
Self  Other 
3 4  3 4 
Know = 
Right 
Yes No .33 .14  .11 .13 
Yes Bias Yes Yes .44 .86  .67 .57 
No Bias No No - -  .11 .13 
Inverse No Yes .06 -  .06 .13 
 Non-
response 
Yes .17 -  .06 .04 
Note: Non-responses could not be categorized as a discernibly affirmative or negative response.  
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Table 5.  
 
Proportion of children using each type of Belief Understanding in Study 2 
 
Response 3-year-olds 4-year-olds 
Reality Reasoning .89 .52 
Mixed Reasoning .11 .9 
Perceptual Access Reasoning - .17 
Belief Reasoning - .22 
! =  .899, 
 <  .001 
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Figure 1. A diagram of scoring procedures from the seeing leads to knowing task in 
Wimmer, Hogrefe and Perner (1988) and in Pillow (1989). Participants can be can be 
scored within-agent but across trials as used in Wimmer et. al. (1988), or within-trial, but 
across agents as used in Pillow (1989).   
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Figure 2. Illustration of the procedures for the self- and other-version of the seeing leads 
to knowing task in Study 1 and Study 2.  
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Figure 3. Illustration of the self- and other-versions of the knowing means getting it right 
task from Study 1. 
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Figure 4. Predicted Probability of passing the Self and Other version of the Seeing Leads 
to knowing Task by Age (in months) in Study 1.  
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Figure 5. Illustration of the self- and other-versions of the knowing means getting it right 
task from Study 2. 
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APPENDIX A 
DETAILED STUDY PROCEDURES AND DATA COLLECTION FORMS 
  
 49 
Self Knowledge (Language Comprehension) 
1 white box and 1 red box with lids 
A key in one of the boxes 
E: I’m going to show you what is in the while box, but not what is in the red box. 
Open white box and show child. Let child take key out, hold it, and replace. Keep box 
open while you ask Control Q1. 
If they don’t know, tell them what it is, re-ask and re-record response. 
Control Q1:  What is in here?   Child’s 1st response: _________________ 2nd: 
____________ 
Close the box. 
E: I’m going to ask you if you know what is in each of these boxes.   Tell me “yes” if you 
know or “no” if you don’t know. 
If child doesn’t say “yes” or “no” prompt once by repeating the last sentence above and 
re-asking Test Question 
 
Test Q1: Do you know what is in the white box?    [Record everything said by both 
people verbatim] 
C:_________________________ Prompt if necessary:  _______ Child’s response to 
prompt:   
 
Test Q2: Do you know what is in the red box?  
C:_________________________ Prompt if necessary:  _______ Child’s response to 
prompt:   
 
 
  
 50 
Other Knowledge (Language Comprehension) 
A green box and a blue box with lids 
1 new doll (Jane) 
 
E: I’m going to show Jane what is in this green box, but I’m not going to show her what 
is in the blue box. 
Open the green box and have Jane look in. Do not let the child look in.  
E: Jane says, “OK, I see what is in the box.”   Close the box. 
 
E: I’m going to ask you if Jane knows what’s in each of these boxes. Say “yes” if she 
knows or “no” if she doesn’t know. 
If child doesn’t say “yes” or “no” prompt once by repeating the last sentence above and 
re-asking Test Question 
 
Test Q1: Jane looked in the green box. Does Jane know what is in the green box?   
[Record everything said verbatim] 
C:_________________________ Prompt if necessary:  _______ Child’s response to 
prompt:   
 
Test Q2: Jane did not look in the blue box. Does Jane know what is in the blue box?   
C:_________________________ Prompt if necessary:  _______ Child’s response to 
prompt:   
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APPENDIX B 
JUSTIFICATION CODES FOR TRUE BELIEF CONTENTS TASK 
  
 59 
3 = Belief 
Belief Question: Pass (“M&M’s”)  
Justification Question: explicitly or implicitly say that the type of box causes 
character to think there are M&M’s inside. 
• Explicit: “he sees M&M’s on the box so he knows what’s inside” 
• Implicit [implies the box makes him think it’s M&M’s]: “it’s a M&M’s 
box” “M&M’s are always in these boxes” “that’s what the box is for”  
 
2 = Perceptual Access 
A. Belief Question: Fail (“Key” or “both key & M&M’s”) 
 Justification Question: explicitly or implicitly describe one or more of the 3 
parts of PAR (not see => not know => be wrong) 
• Not see: “he hasn’t looked inside” “he didn’t see us take key out / put 
M&M’s in” 
• Not know: “he doesn’t know what’s inside” “he doesn’t know what we 
put inside” or  Uncertainty: “he’ll guess” “he’ll think both” “he’ll 
think maybe it’s a key” “it could be M&M’s or a key” 
• Explicit be wrong: “he’ll be wrong” Implicit be wrong: “key is not in 
there” “M&M’s are in there” “key was in there first” “key used to be 
there” “we took out the key” “when he looks he’ll find M&M’s”  
B. Belief Question: Pass (“M&Ms”) 
 Justification Question: explicitly or implicitly describe one or both of the first 2 
parts of PAR (not see => not know) 
• Not see: “he hasn’t looked inside” “he didn’t see us take key out / put 
M&M’s in” 
• Not know: “he doesn’t know what’s inside” “he doesn’t know what we 
put inside” or  Uncertainty: “he’ll guess” “he’ll think both” “he’ll 
think maybe it’s M&M’s” “it could be M&M’s or a key” 
 
1 = Reality 
A. Belief Question: Pass (“M&M’s”) 
 Justification Question: explicitly or implicitly say that there are M&M’s inside 
• Explicit: “M&M’s are in there”  
• Implicit: “he wants them” “he likes M&M’s” 
B. Belief Question: Pass (“M&M’s”) 
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 Justification Question: explicitly say the character will get perceptual 
information about the M&M’s inside, which will then cause him to know there 
are M&M’s inside. 
• “he will look inside” “he’ll see the M&M’s” “he won’t see any key” 
“he’ll shake the box” “it sounds like it” “there will be M&M’s in 
there”  
 
0 = Other 
Belief Question: Pass (“M&M’s”) or Fail (“key” or “both M&M’s and key”) 
Justification Question: including but not limited to the following: 
• "I don't know" 
• Making up additional information: “he heard me” “he saw someone 
put a key in there” “he put the key in” 
• Reiteration of answer to the Belief Question: (M&M’s) “because he 
thinks it’s M&M’s”; (key) “because he thinks it’s a key.” 
• Contradiction of answer to the Belief Question: (M&M’s) “because he 
thinks it’s a key”; (key) “because he thinks it’s M&M’s” “because it’s 
a M&M’s box” 
• Misrepresentation of the contents: (key) “because there’s a key in 
there” 
• Irrelevant responses 
 
 
Justification Codes for False Belief Contents Task 
3 = Belief 
Belief Question: Pass (“crayons”) 
Justification Question: either explicitly or implicitly say that the type of box 
causes character to think there are crayons inside. 
• Explicit: “he sees crayons on the box so he knows what’s inside” 
• Implicit [implies box makes him think it’s crayons]: “it’s a crayon 
box” “crayons are always in these boxes” “that’s what the box is for” 
 
2 = Perceptual Access 
A. Belief Question: Pass (“crayons”) or Fail (“both crayons and car”) 
 Justification Question: explicitly or implicitly describing one or more of the 3 
parts of PA reasoning (not see => not know => be wrong) 
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• Not see: “he hasn’t looked inside” “he didn’t see us put the car in” 
• Not know: “he doesn’t know what’s inside” “he doesn’t know what we 
put inside” or Uncertainty: “he’ll guess” “he’ll think both” “he’ll think 
maybe it’s crayons” “it could be crayons or a car” 
• Explicit be wrong: “he’ll be wrong” Implicit be wrong: “crayons are 
not in there” “a car is in there” “crayons were in there first” ”crayons 
used to be there” “you took out the crayons” “when he looks he’ll find 
the car”   
B. Belief Question: Fail (“car”)  
 Justification Question: explicitly or implicitly describing one or both of the 
first 2 parts of PA reasoning (not see => not know) 
• Not see: “he hasn’t looked inside” “he didn’t see us put the car in” 
• Not know: “he doesn’t know what’s inside” “he doesn’t know what we 
put inside” or Uncertainty: “he’ll guess” “he’ll think both” “he’ll think 
maybe it’s a car” “it could be crayons or a car” 
 
1 = Reality 
A. Belief Question: Fail (“car”) 
 Justification Question: either explicitly or implicitly saying that there is a car 
inside  
• Explicit: “the car is in there” 
• Implicit: “he wants the car” “he likes to play with it”  
B. Belief Question: Fail (“car”) 
 Justification Question: explicitly saying the character will get perceptual 
information about the car inside, which will then cause him to know there is a 
car inside.  
• “he will look inside” “he’ll see the car” “he won’t see any crayons” 
“he’ll shake the box” “it sounds like it” “there will be a car in there” 
 
0 = Other 
Belief Question: Pass (“key”) or Fail (“car” or “both crayons and car”) 
Justification Question: including but not limited to the following: 
• "I don't know" 
• Making up Additional information: “he heard me” “he saw someone 
put a car in there” “he put the car in” 
• Reiteration of answer to the Belief Question: (crayons) “Because he 
thinks it’s crayons” (car) “Because he thinks it’s a car.” 
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• Contradiction of answer to the Belief Question: (crayons) “Because he 
thinks it’s a car” (car) “Because he thinks it’s crayons” “Because it’s a 
crayons box” 
• Misrepresents the contents: (crayons) “Because there are crayons in 
there.” 
• Irrelevant responses  
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APPENDIX C 
IRB APPROVAL MATERIALS 
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